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CRACKS IN THE COST STRUCTURE OF AGENCY
ADOPTION
ANDREA B. CARROLL

I.

•

INTRODUCTION

Domestic adoption is big business. 1 "Baby
2
However, a close
selling" has long been vilified and remains unlawful.
It is no longer a secret.

examination of the cash that changes hands in the garden-variety domestic
adoption would make it difficult for most people to tell the difference. 3
Prospective adoptive parents pay agencies and lawyers exceptional sums to
identify and locate birth parents that are willing to relinquish their parental
4
rights.
Hospital and delivery charges, often not covered by private
Copyright© 2011, Andrea B. Carroll.
•

C.E. Laborde, Jr. Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law

Center. I thank the Capital University Law Review for the opportunity to present an earlier
version of this piece at its 6th Annual Wells Conference on Adoption Law. Laura Pryor and
Katie Rittiner (LSU Law Center Class of201 l ) provided excellent research assistance.
1

Sandra Patton-Imani, Redefining the Ethics of Adoption, Race, Gender, and Class, 36

LAW & Soc'y REV., 813, 827 (2002).
2

See Tamar Lewin, At Core of Adoption Dispute Is Crazy Quilt of State Laws, N.Y.

TIMES, Jan. 19, 2001, at A l 4; US. Embassy Report Faults

Vietnam's Oversight of

Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2008, at A7; see also In re Adoption of Stephen, 645
N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1014 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1996); Sale of Children in Interstate and Foreign
Commerce: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the
Judiciary H

of Reps., 95th Cong.

(1977),

available at http://poundpuplegacy.org/

files/4e.pdf [hereinafter Hearings].
3

See generally Douglas H. Reiniger, Ethical Considerations in Representing Birth

Parents: Regulation of Adoption Expenses, in AooPTION LAW INSTITUTE 2007, at 183 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. C-211, 2007); Commentary, End
Baby Commerce, GAMBIT WE EKLY, June 10, 1999, at 7.
4

See Laura Mansnerus, Market Puts Price Tags on the Priceless: In Search of a Child:

The Baby Bazaar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1998, at Al (explaining that adoption costs can
range from $5,000 to $100,000).

State laws generally permit agencies to charge service

fees for each adoption they facilitate.

See ALA. CODE§ 26-10-4. l (a) (LexisNexis 2009);

DE L . CODE ANN . tit. 13, § 928(b) (2009); D.C. CODE§ 4-1410 (2008); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 525/1 (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a)(l) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN .
§ 199.590(2) (West 2006); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN art. 1200(8) (2004); MD. CODE ANN .,
.

FAM. LAW § 5-362(b)(2)

(LexisNexis

2006);

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN . § 127.27 5(1)

(LexisNexis 2010); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN § 170-8:13(1) (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT.
.

ANN.§ 9:3-39. l (e) (West 2002); N. M. STAT. ANN.§ 32A-5-34(B) (2003); N.Y. Soc. SERV.
(continued)
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insurance

or

are

Medicaid,

borne

by

seeking

families

to

a dopt. 5

Prospective adoptive parents almost always cover fees for mental health
6
Travel and incidental costs frequently
counseling to birth mothers.
amount to thousands of dollars.7 Legal representation for both the adoptive
and birth parents to finalize the placement costs a substantial sum. 8

In

short, the expense of a domestic agency adoption can decimate a family

budget. 9

Moreover, parents desiring to build their families through adoption are
Healthy, white infants are adopted so

almost assured a long haul.

frequently that parents seeking such a child often wait years before finally
10
Still, there is no overage
becoming parents through an agency adoption.

LAW§ 374(6) (McKinney 2010); N.C.

GEN. STAT. A NN.§

48 - 1 0-103(e) (2009); Omo REV.

CODE A NN.§ 3107.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 0,§ 7505-3.2
(West 2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
3 1 0(F) (2010); VT. STAT.
(2007); W. VA. CODE

ANN

ANN. §

.

ANN

.

§ 2533 (d) (West 201 0); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-

tit. ISA, § 7- 104 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-12 1 8

48-22-803(e) (LexisNexis 2009).

An attorney may be paid

additional fees by the adoptive family for services in connection with an adoption.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-l 1 4(D) (2007); COLO. REV. STAT.
STAT.

ANN. § 63.097(2)(f)( l )

(West 2005); LA. CH. CODE

See

§ 1 9-5-213(l)(a) (20 1 0); FLA.
ANN. art. 1200(8)(8) (2004);

MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-1 5-23(4) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1 70-B : l 3 ( 1 ) (LexisNexis
20 10); N.C.

GEN.

STAT. ANN.§ 48-1 0-103(a) (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 1 4-15-10(1 )

(2009); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3 1 07.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2533(d) (West 201 0); s.c. CODE ANN. § 63-9-3 1 0(F) (20 1 0); TE NN. CODE
ANN. § 36-l-109(a)(l )(B)(i) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-7-20 3 ( l )(a) (LexisNexis 2008);
W. VA. CODE ANN.§ 48-22-803(e) (LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 48.913 ( 1 ) (West
2008 & Supp. 20 10).
5

2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption§ 57 (2004); UNIF. AooPTION ACT

§

7-103(a)(3), 9 U.L.A. 126

( 1 999).
6

See UNIF. AooPTION ACT§ 7-1 03(a)(4), 9 U.L.A. 1 26; see also Adoption of Stephen,

645 N.Y.S.2d at 1 0 1 5 (finding that payment of counseling expenses was proper and
reasonable).
7

See, e.g., Adoption of Stephen, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 10 1 4.

8 Reiniger, supra note 3, at 1 88; see also Katy Ruth Klinke, Note, The Baby M
Controversy: A Class Distinction, 1 8 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1 13 , 1 48 (1 993) (discussing a
lawyer who received $ 1 84,000 for arranging surrogacy contracts in 1 983).

9 Fronting tens of thousands of dollars in costs for an adoption can be difficult or
impossible, even for families who can reasonably support an adopted child. See Klinke,
supra note 8, at 1 48; Lewin, supra note 2, at A l 4. The cost of raising a child is borne over
a lengthy period. Adoption expenses, however, often rival an average American family's

annual income. See Klinke, supra note 8, at 1 48; Lewin, supra note 2, at A l 4.
IO
Mansnerus, supra note 4, at A l .
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11
Infants do not typically
of infants available for adoption in this country.
12
wait to find suitable adoptive parents.
Quite the contrary. This state of
affairs is deceptive because it creates an inappropriate level of societal
comfort with America's private adoptio n system.

If parents wanting to

adopt will pay whatever is required, and most babies in need of adoption
find adoptive homes, then what is the problem? Does the cost structure of
the domestic adoption scheme need to b e modified at all?
This article argues that private adoption, viewed purely from an
13
economic standpoint, is broken. A near free market has taken hold. And
14
that free market substantially prejudices prospective adoptive parents.
Children are being adopted,

but adoption needs

to be less costly.

Legislatures should act to cap adoption expenses, provide remedies for
prospective adoptive parents in failed adoptions, and offer better tax
incentives to prospective adoptive parents. A more active regulation of the
agency-adoptio n market would aid prospective adoptive parents, likely
spur more Americans to adopt, and thereby, increase the likelihood of a
positive adoption outcome for adoptees.

II. CAPPING ADOPTION EXPENSES
The purchase and sale of children today remains, as it has for many
15
years, unlawful in every American state.
Many states regulate the sale of
11
12

Id at A l 6.
d.

I

13 See Elisabeth M. Landes

& Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage,

7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 324 (1978) (arguing, controversially, that an experimental move
toward a free market in adoption would serve to rectify the supply and demand mismatch
plaguing the system); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67
B.U.

L. REv.

59, 7 1 (1987) (arguing, nearly ten years after the "Baby Shortage" piece, that

legal schemes allowing the payment of substantial sums to birth mothers are really sales in
disguise).
14 See Landes

& Posner, supra note 13, at 71.

15 See WILLIAM MEEZAN, SANFORD KATZ

& EVA MANOFF Russo, ADOPTIONS WITHOUT

AGENCIES: A STUDY OF INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS 182 (1978); Vanessa s. Browne-Barbour,
Bartering for Babies: Are Preconception Agreements in the Best Interests of Children?, 26
WHITTIER L. REv. 429, 473 (2004).
states.

Criminal statutes punish the practice in thirty-three

See A LA. CODE§ 26-lOA-34 (LexisNexis 2009); CAL. PENAL CODE§ 273(a) (West

2008); COLO. REV.

STAT.§

19-5-213(1)-{2) (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 63.212(l)(c) (West

2005 & Supp. 2010); GA. CODE ANN § 19-8-24 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN § 18-1511
.

.

(2004); IND. CODE ANN.§ 35-46-l-9(a) (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 600.9(1)(c) (West
2001 & Supp. 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 199.493 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:286 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-603 (LexisNexis 2002);

MASS. GEN.
(continued)
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LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § l l A (West 2007 & Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN
§ 710.54(1) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55 (West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN § 4315-23 (2009); Mo. ANN STAT.§ 568.175(1) (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 42-7-105(3)
(2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 127.287-288 (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN . § 9:339. l (d) (West 2002); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§§ 374(6), 389(2) (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN § 48-10-102 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-05 (1997 & Supp. 2009);
OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 21, § 866 (West 2002); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 4305 (West 1983);
S.C. CODE ANN § 16-3-1060 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-6-4.1-4.2 (2004); TENN.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

CODE ANN.§ 36-1-109 (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 25.08 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010);

UTAH

CODE

ANN. §

76-7-203(2) (LexisNexis 2008);

VA.

CODE ANN. § 63.2-1218 (2007);

§ 9A.64.030 (West 2010); w. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-803
STAT. ANN § 948.24 (West 2005). A dditionally, fourteen states
through case law. See People v. Daniel, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 3, 5-6

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
(LexisNexis 2009); WIS.
denounce the practice

.

(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (convicting the defendant of "attempted sale of a person" for
demanding $90,000 in exchange for consent to the adoption of his seventeen-month-old
daughter); Adoption House, Inc. v. P.M., No. 02-12-071N, 00-37796, 2003 WL 23354141,
at *7-10 (Del. Fam. Ct. Oct. 9, 2003) (holding that a fee paid to a biological parent or a fee
charged by an adoption agency for more than the reasonable costs associated with an
adoption constitutes "unjustifiable conduct" depriving a court of jurisdiction to terminate
parental

rights);

Douglas

v.

State, 438 S.E.2d 361, 361 (Ga. 1994) (offering an automobile

in exchange for the biological mother's consent to adoption violated a statute making it
unlawful to induce parents to part with their children); In

re

Kindgren, 540 N.E.2d 485,

488-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that consent was fraudulently obtained where adoptive
parents paid the birth mother $10,000 to cover medical expenses without being aware of
what the expenses were); In

re Adoption of Baby Boy

M., 18 P.3d 304, 305 (Kan. Ct. App.

2001) (holding that a trial court erred in ordering adoptive parents to reimburse Medicaid
for payments for birth mother's expenses where no law required them to do so); State v.
Roberts, 471 So. 2d 900, 901-02 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the biological mother
violated the statute by selling her child to a police officer in Louisiana for $3,000); State v.
Runkles, 605 A.2d 111, 120 (Md. 1992) (finding that a mother who was persuaded by her
boyfriend to relinquish her child to the boyfriend's father for $4,000 did not violate the
statute because she did not know of the payment); Doe v. Kelly, 307 N.W.2d 438, 440--41
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the defendant violated the statute by offering to
relinquish her child for $5,000); Balouch v. State, 938 So. 2d 253, 258 (Miss. 2006)
(holding that the defendant violated the statute by offering to give up her child for $5,000);
State v. Daugherty, 744 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the defendant
was guilty of trafficking of children for offering to pay $1,000 for the adoption of a child);
Gray v. Maxwell, 293 N.W.2d 90, 95 (Neb. 1980) (finding relinquishment of a child done
in consideration of promise to pay a sum of money in excess of legitimate expenses against
public policy);

In re

Adoption of Baby Boy P., 700 N.Y.S.2d 792, 798 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.

1999) (reducing excessive agency fees and disallowing both attorney fees for services
provided to the natural father and car maintenance expenses);

In re

Adoption of Stephen,

(continued)
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children b y criminalizing the transfer of "anything of value" in connection
16
with an adoptive placement.
Still, the cost of agency adoption is
17
staggering-frequently in excess of $40,000 -with nearly all states
excepting from their baby-selling prohibitions agency fees, 18 medical

645 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1014-15 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1996) (holding that living expenses paid to a
birth mother and rent by adoption agency violated statute); In re Adoption of Alyssa, L.B.,
501 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596-97 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986) (holding that expenses are limited to those
"incidental to the birth or care of the adoptive child, the pregnancy or care of the adoptive
child's mother, or the placement or adoption of the child" but cannot include an automobile
for the birth mother); Jn re Adoption of P.E.P., 407 S.E.2d 505, 510 (N.C. 1991) (finding
payment of fees including travel expenses, medical expenses of the parent, six month lease
of an apartment, weekly stipend for three months, and attorney fees violated the statute); In

re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925, 927-28 (Pa. 1986) (allowing adoptive parents to pay only
expenses related to the care of the child); DeJesus v. State, 889 S.W.2d 373, 37 5-77 (Tex.
App. 1994) (upholding the defendant's conviction for the sale of a child because over
$10,000 in payments were made outside of the confines of the statute); Thacker v. State,
889 S.W.2d 380, 384-86 (Tex. App. 1994) (finding that a mother and an attorney violated
the statute when the attorney paid the mother a total of $12,000 for her five children).
16

See, e.g., ARI.z. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(C) (2007) (prohibiting compensation for
consenting to place a child for adoption). But see id § 8-114(A) (allowing a court to
approve any reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in connection with the adoption,
including "costs for medical and hospital care and examinations for the mother and child,
counseling fees, legal fees, agency fees, living expenses, and any other costs the court finds
reasonable and necessary''). See also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-l-9(a) (West 2004)
(establishing the transfer of property for consent to adoption as a Class D felony). But see
id § 35-46-1-9(b) (allowing payment for attorney's fees, hospital and medical expenses,
agency fees, birth parent counseling, costs of housing, utilities, phone service, or any
additional itemized necessary living expense for birth mother during the second or third
trimester of pregnancy and not more than six weeks afet r birth, maternity clothing, travel
expenses that relate to the pregnancy or adoption, and actual wages lost).
17

Costs of Adoption, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY FACTSHEETS FOR
FAMILIES (Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Washington, D.C.), June 2004, at 2, available
at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/s_cost/s_costs.pdf. It is not at all uncommon for
complicated domestic adoptions to approach $100,000. Mansnerus, supra note 4, at Al.
18
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928(b) (2009) (stating a service fee may be
charged by an adoption agency "for each adoption in an amount not exceeding the cost of
services rendered, to be paid by the adopting parent or parents"); KAN. STA T. ANN. § 59212l(a) (2005) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, no person shall request, receive,
give or offer to give any consideration in connection with an adoption, or a placement for
adoption, other than: ( 1) reasonable fees for legal and other professional services rendered
in connection with the placement or adoption not to exceed customary fees for similar
services by professionals of equivalent experience and reputation where the services are
(continued)
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21
.
20
and
.
expenses,
b1rth-mother-l'ivmg
counseling expenses,
22
States allow these payments in connection with an adoptive
legal fees.
expenses,

19

performed . . . (2) reasonable fees in the state of Kansas of a licensed child-placing
agency . . . . ).
19

"

See ALA. CODE§ 26-lOA-34 (LexisNexis 2009); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 8-114(A)
(2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-206(c) (2009); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8610(a) (West 2004);
FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 63.097(2)(b) (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-13(c) (2010); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-1511 (2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 52514 (West 2010); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-46-1-9(b) (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a)(4) (2005); LA. CHILD.
CODE ANN. art. 1200(B)(l) (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 18, § 9-306(a)(3) (1998); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-362(b)(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 710.54(3)(b) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 259.55(1) (West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN.
.

.

§ 43-15-23(4) (2009); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.075(1)(1) (West 2003); MONT. CODJ? ANN.
§ 42-7-101(1) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(3) (LexisNexis 2010); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 170-B:l3(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN . § 9:3-39.l(e) (West
2002); N.M. STAT. ANN § 32A-5-34(B)(2) (2003); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(6)
.

(McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 48-10-103(e) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 1415-lO(l)(c) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(C)(l}-(2) (West 2005 & Supp.
2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 10, § 7505-3.2(B)(l)(b) (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT.
.

§ 109.311(1) (2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 2533(d)(l) (West 2010); s.c. CODE ANN.
§ 63-9-310(F)(l) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-l-109(B)(i) (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 25.08(b)(2)

(West

2003

&

Supp.

2010);

UTAH

CODE

ANN. § 76-7-

203(1)(a)(iii)(A)(IIl) (LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-103(a)(2) (2002); VA.
CODE ANN.§ 63.2-1218 (2007); WASH. REv. CODE.ANN.§ 9A.64.030(2)(f)(West 2010); w.
VA. CODE ANN.§ 48-22-803(e)(2) (LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 48.913(1)(£}-(g)
(West 2008 & Supp. 2010).
20

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-l14(A) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-728
(West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-l-9(b)(4) (West 2004); LA. CH. CODE ANN . art.
1200(B)(5) (2004); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-306(a)(2) (1998); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 710.54(5) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN § 259.55(1) (West 2007); MISS.
CODE ANN.§ 43-15-117(4) (2009); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.075(1)(2) (West 2003); MONT.
CODE ANN.§ 42-7-lOl(l)(g) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § l 70-B:13(1)(a) (LexisNexis
2010); N.J. STAT. ANN . § 9:3-39.l(e) (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(B)(3)
.

(West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN § 48-10-l03(e) (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
.

§ 7505-3.2(B)(l)(c) (West 2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2533(d)(3) (West 2010);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-l-l09(a)(l)(B)(i) (2010); Tux . PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08(b)(2)
(West 2003 & Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE ANN . § 76-7-203(l)(a)(iii)(A)(V) (LexisNexis
2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-l03(a)(3) (2002); VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.2-1218 (2007);
WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 48.913(1)(a)-(b) (West 2008 & Supp. 2010).
21

See ALA. CODE§ 26-lOA-34 (LexisNexis 2009); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 8-l14(A)
(2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8610(a) (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-728(c)
(West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 63.097(2)(a) (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 16-1515(1)
(continued)
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placement to facilitate adoption. 23 The theory is that adoption will remain
a viable alternative for women facing unplanned pregnancies so long as it

(2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.l(a) (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-19(b)(5) (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN . § 600.9(2)(d) (West 2001 & Supp. 2010);

KAN .

STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a)(6) (2005); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN . art. 1200(8)(7) (2004); ME.
R.Ev. STAT. ANN . tit. 18-A, § 9-306(a)(6) (1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(3Xd)

(West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN . § 259.55(4) (West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-117(4)
(2009); Mo. ANN . STAT. § 453.075(1)(5) (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-7-IOl(l)(h)
(2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(3) (LexisNexis 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 170-B:l3(1)(d) (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.l(e) (West 2002); N.M.
STAT. ANN . § 32A-5-34(B)(4) (2003); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McK inney 2010);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-103(a)(4) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-lO(l)(e) (2009);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(CX9) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); OK.LA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 7505-3.2(B)(l)(e) (West 2009); S.C. CODE ANN . § 63-9-310(F)(l) (2010); TENN.
CODE ANN . § 36-l-109(aXl)(B) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203(1)(aXiii)(A)(VI)
(LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN . tit. 15A, § 7-103(a)(4) (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.21218 (2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.913(l)(i) (West 2008 & Supp. 2010).
22

See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-34(b) (LexisNexis 2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-

l 14(A) (2007);

ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-22l(c) (2009); Cow. R.Ev. STAT. § 19-5-213(1)(a)

(2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928(b) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.097(2)(d) (West
2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1515(1) (2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.l(g) (West
2010);

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a)(l) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(6)(a)

(West 2006); LA. CHILD CODE ANN. art. 1200(B)(8) (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 18-A,
.

§ 9-306(a)(l) (1998); Mo. CODE ANN. , FAM. LAW § 5-362(b)(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2006);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(3)(f) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55(1) (West
2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-117(4) (2009); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.075(1X4) (West
2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-7-lOl(l)(i) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:l3(1)(a)
(LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.l(eX3) (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A5-34(B)(6) (2003); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 48-10-103(a)(6) (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-lO(l)(b) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE

ANN § 3107.055(C)(3) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); OK.LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 75053. 2(B)(l)(a) (West 2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 2533(d)(4) (West 2010); S.C. CODE
.

.

ANN. § 63-9-310(F)(5) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN . § 36-l-109(a)(l)(B) (2010); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN . § 25.08(bX2) (West

2003

&

Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-

203(l)(a)(iii)(A)(I) (LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-103(a)(6) (2002); VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1218 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.64.030(2)(f)(West 2010); w.
VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-803(e)(2) (LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.913(1)(h)
(West 2008 & Supp. 2010).

2
3 See Reiniger, supra note 3, at 188 (arguing that the purpose of "expense statutes" is

to make adoption "a financially neutral option for the birth mother").
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Not all allowable

expenses serve that purpose, however. Indeed, some state laws provide a
rather generous possibility of profit for birth mothers choosing adoption.25
The harms of a private-adoption scheme, which are startlingly close to
sanctioning a free market in infants, have been chronicled elsewhere and
This piece focuses solely on the need to

are relatively well accepted.26

reduce exorbitant expenses for prospective adoptive parents. The first step
in so doing is a small and simple one to take: expense caps on fees paid in
connection with agency adoptions should be expanded dramatically.
A number of states already cap living expenses paid to birth mothers in
connection with an adoption to small sums ranging from $1,500 to
$5,000.27 But states still have much further to go.28 The vast majority of

24

See FAQ's A bout Birth Mother Expenses, ACADEMY OF CALIFORNIA ADoPTION

LAWYERS, http://www.acal.org/birth.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).

The Academy of

California Adoption Lawyers describes payments from adoptive parents to birth parents as
for the purpose of making adoption a .. financially neutral option for the birth mother" rather
than a money-making opportunity.

Id.; see also Hearings, supra note 2, at 17-18

(testimony of William Acosta, Deputy Comm'r, Div. of Servs., N.Y. Dep't of Soc. Servs.);
Candice M. Zierdt, Compensation for Birth Mothers: A Challenge to the Adoption Laws, 23
LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 25, 62 (1991); Jennifer L. Watson, Comment, Growing a Baby for Sale or

Merely Renting a Womb: Should Surrogate Mothers Be Compensated for Their Services?, 6
WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADvoc. 529, 539 (2007).
25

See Andrea B. Carroll, Re-Regulating the Baby Market: A Call for a Ban on Payment

of Birth Mother Living Expenses, 59 KAN L. REv. 285, 290-95 (2011).
.

6
2

See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849

(1987)

(describing multiple

to

harms

personhood

and

society flowing from

the

commodification of infants, including the exacerbation of existing class, race, and gender
divisions);

see

also

Barbara

Rothman,

K.

Reproductive

Technology

the

and

Commodification of Life, in EMBRYOS, ETHICS AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS: EXPLORING THE
NEW RE PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 95, 96-97 (Elaine H. Baruch et al. eds., 1988) (arguing

that commodification in the surrogacy context affects women's self-respect and self-worth).
27

Three states provide specific dollar caps. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-728c

(West 2004) ($1,500 cap); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(CX9) (West 2005 & Supp.
2010) ($3,000 cap); WIS . STAT. ANN § 48.913(l )(i) (West 2008 & Supp. 2010) ($5,000
.

cap).

More than twenty others limit expenses to those adjudged "reasonable" or

"necessary." See A LA . CODE § 26- lOA-34 (LexisNexis 2009); ARI.z. REV. STAT. ANN § 8.

l 14(A) (2007); CAL. PENAL CODE§ 273(b) (West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 63.097(2) (West
2005); IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 16-1515(1) (2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 525/4.l (a) (West
.

2010); IND. CODE ANN.§ 35-46- l -9(b) (West 2004); KAN STAT. ANN.§ 59-2121(a) (2005);
.

MICH . COMP. LAWS ANN § 710.54(3) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN § 259.55 (West
.

.

2007); MISS. CODE ANN.§ 43-15-117(4) (2009); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 42-7-101(1) (2009);
(continued)
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states do not place any specific dollar limitations on birth mother living
29
Moreover, prospective adoptive parents under this "living
expenses.
expenses" umbrella often shoulder expenses tangentially related to the
30
birth and adoptive placement.
In Massachusetts for instance, prospective
adoptive parents may legally pay a birth mother up to $980 per month in
rent, utilities, food, and clothing and an additional $500 monthly for
31
"educational, vocational, recreational, or religious services."
The
allowance for such a breadth of payments demonstrates an adoption
scheme run amuck.

The effect of such loose regulation of birth mother

living expenses is predictable and real: birth mothers flock to states that
liberally sanction the payment of living expenses and

provide the
32
opportunity to gain financially through an adoptive placement.
Capping

the payment of living expenses to very small sums closely related to the

NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(3) (LexisNexis 2010); N.H. R..Ev. STAT. ANN. § l 70B:l 3(1) (LexisNexis 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(B) (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 7505-3.2 (West 2009); s.c. CODE ANN.§ 63-9-310(F) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 361-109 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A,
§ 7-103(a) (2002); V A. CODE ANN.§ 63.2-1218 (2007).
28
See generally Carroll, supra note 25 (arguing for a nationwide ban on payment of
birth mother living expenses).
29

See Regulation of Private Adoption Expenses: Summary o f State Laws, CHILD

WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY STATE STATUTES

(Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,

Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2010, at 3, available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide
/laws_policies/statutes/expensesall.pdf (explaining that only a small number of states place
actual dollar figures on expense caps).
30 See

Carroll, supra note 25, at 28-29 (describing the manner in which allowing the

payment of birth mother living expenses results in arguments for covering cars, massages,
and health club expenses).
31

Adoptive Families Magazine, Adoption La ws by State, THE ADOPTION GUIDE (2008),

http://www.adoptivefamilies.corn/adoptionlaws.
32 See,

e.g.,

Adoption House, Inc. v. P.M., No. 02-12-07TN, 00-37796, 2003 WL

23354141 (Del. Fam. Ct. Oct. 9, 2003). In Adoption House, a birth mother refused to agree
to adoption in Pennsylvania because at that time Pennsylvania law did not permit the
payment of birth mother living expenses. See id. at *3. She decided instead on a couple
from New York, a state that allowed living expenses. See id. Two years later, when the
same birth mother sought an adopting couple for another child, she decided first on a couple
from Louisiana, who later changed their minds at the hospital after learning the child was
biracial. Id. at *4. The birth mother finally decided on a Delaware couple because
Delaware state law permitted the payment ofliving expenses. See id at *5; see also Zierdt,
supra note 24, at 31-32.
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birth and placement of a child, like Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Ohio have
33
done, is a step all states should pursue.
However, caps on expenses paid to a birth mother in connection with
an adoption are but one piece of the puzzle of reducing the cost of
domestic adoption.

Limiting the fees charged by adoption agencies is

another important step. These fees are far less regulated under state law,
34
and vary quite substantially.
Most agencies charge around $15,000 for
their fees alone in brokering an adoption, with no guarantee to prospective
adoptive parents that a placement will take place after the payment is made
and no duty on the agency's part to recompense the fee if a placement is
35
not made.
Certainly, any suggestion that private agencies should be hamstrung by
36
fee caps is a controversial one, particularly to free market devotees.
However, while some fear that the adoption market is moving more
37
towards a free one, it is not there yet.
The fact that adoption is such big
38
business demonstrates the problem precisely. Even non-profit players in
39
A
adoption post huge revenues and salaries for their top employees.

2004 Forbes report, for instance, reported that Catholic Charities USA-a
non-profit agency heavily involved in domestic adoption-brought in non
profit earnings after expenses of nearly

$3 billion, with the top earner

33 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-728c (West

2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 3107.055(C)(9) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 48.913(l )(i) (West 2008 &
Supp. 2010).
34 Lois Gilman & Susan Freivalds, Adopting Smart: How Adoption Works and How

Much It Costs, ADOPTIVE FAMILIES, http://www.adoptivefamilies.com/adoption.php (last
visited Oct. 28, 2010) (detailing variation in costs of a domestic agency adoption).

35 See, e.g., Domestic Adoption Costs, ADOPTIONSERVICES.ORG, http://www.adoptionser

vices.org/adoption/adoption_costs_domestic.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2010) (describing
typical fees associated with domestic adoption).

36 See generally Posner, supra note 13 (discussing a free market in babies).

37 See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Approaching Surrogate Motherhood: Reconsidering

Difference, 26 VT. L. R.Ev. 407, 418 (2002). The wealth of baby-selling statutes make it
clear that Landes and Posner's 1978 free market proposal has not been wholly embraced by
American states.

Compare Landes & Posner, supra note 1 3 (presenting the 1978 free

market proposal), with sources cited supra note 15 (detailing state statutes prohibiting baby
selling).

38 See source cited supra note 1 and accompanying text.

39 William P. Barrett, America's Most (and Least) Efficient Charities, FORBES.COM

(Nov. 24, 2004, 2:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/finance/lists/14/2004/LIR.jhtml ?passLis
tld= l 4&passYear=2004&passListType= Misc&datatype=Misc&uniqueld=CH003.
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making $1 16,362 annually. 40 Much of those adoption agency earnings
come, of course, from agency fees prospective adoptive parents pay for the
brokerage of an adoptive match. 41 In addition, many of the reasons for
limiting expenses prospective adoptive parents may pay a b irth mother in
connection with an adoption-reducing the infringement on a birth
mother's voluntariness and more strongly encouraging quality parents to
consider adoption42----cry out for state interference in regulating agency
fees as well. As long as state law prohibits baby selling and a free market
of infant sale is not the norm, states should pursue fee limitations and other
reasonable means of modifying the cost structure of the adoption scheme
in a manner that actually serves to foster adoption.
Ill. PROVIDING GREATER REMEDIES FOR FAILED ADOPTIONS

The financial risk of a domestic agency adoption is sobering.
Adoptive parents can expect that a successful agency adoption will carry a
hefty price tag. 43 And there is no doubt adoptive parents would willingly
pay that price, and more, for the guarantee of a child. 44 Of course, agency
adoption provides no such guarantee. 45 In fact, domestic-agency-adoption
failure rates are rather alarming.46 No official or governmental statistics
track failure rates with precision,47 but adoption insiders estimate that as
many as half of prospective adoptive families experience at least one failed
match before finalizing an adoption. 48 In eighty percent of the cases in

40

Id.

41

See Domestic Adoption Costs, supra note 35 (noting that the agency service fee is

typically the largest fee a potential adopter will pay).
42

See Carroll, supra note 25, at 31-34.

43

See sources cited supra note 17 and accompanying text.

44 LAURA BEAUVAIS-GoDWIN & RAYMOND GODWIN, THE COMPLETE ADOPTION BOOK:

EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW TO AooPT A CmLD 16 (3d ed. 2005).
45

See id. at xi.

46

See Susan Scherreik, Adoption: Now There's the Cyber-Stork, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug.

14, 2000, at 134E2.
47

See Katherine Q. Seelye, Specialists Report Rise in Adoptions that Fail,

N Y. TIMES,
.

Mar. 24, 1 998, at A14 (stating that there are no exact national statistics available on failed
adoptions).
48

See Scherreik, supra note 46, at 134E2 (estimating a failure rate of between twenty

five and fifty percent); Dan Gearino, Money, Hope Lost in Failed Adoptions, QUAD-CITY
nMES (Feb. 21, 2006, 12:00

AM),

794 7-5759-9d40-8c6f2948e2cc.htrnl

http://www .qctimes.com/news/local/article_4fd32e38(reporting

that a survey

conducted by Adopted

Families m agazine found that twenty-nine percent of readers had a failed adoption).
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which birth mothers create adoption plans with prospective adoptive
families or agencies, birth mothers ultimately choose to parent their

children themselves.49 Emotionally distraught adoptive parents often find

themselves financially devastated also50 because state law provides few
remedies for prospective adoptive parents who become parties to a failed
adoption.51

A. Allowing Recoupmentfrom Birth Mothers
The problem stems

largely from the

fact that adoptive parents

generally have no one from whom to recoup expenses paid in connection
with a failed adoption.52 Agency-drafted adoption contracts nearly always
provide that all fees prospective adoptive parents pay their agencies in
connection with an adoption are wholly non-refundable. 53

Moreover,

agencies often arrange for prospective adoptive parents to directly pay

49

See Mansnerus, supra note 4, at A l 6; see also Steven Pressman, The Baby Brokers,

CAL. LAW., July 1991, at 30, 34, 105.
50

See, e.g., Juman v. Louise Wise Servs., 663 N.Y.S.2d 483, 489 (Sup. Ct. 1 997)

(prohibiting a cause of action allowing adoptive parents to recover for emotional distress);
see also Pressman, supra note 49, at 34 (describing a couple that spent $4,000 on a birth
mother's expenses before finding out that she agreed to place the child with another
family).
51

See, e.g., Engstrom v. State, 461 N.W.2d 309, 3 1 6-19

(Iowa

1 990) (holding that pre

adoptive parents have no implied cause of action under government statutes, no actionable
malpractice claim, and no deprivation of property claim).
52

Because birth mothers may not terminate parental rights in advance of the child's

birth, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN

.

tit. 13, § 1 1 06(c) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN .

§ 1 27.070(1) (LexisNexis 2010), the vast majority of expenses are paid by prospective
adoptive parents before the birth. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 8-l 1 4(B) (2007); CAL. FAM .
CODE§ 8610(a) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 63.132 ( 1 ) (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN .
§ 16- 1 5 1 5 (2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 7 1 0.54(7)(a) (West 2002); Mo. ANN STAT.
.

§ 453.075(1) (West 2003); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ l 70-B:19(V) (LexisNexis 20 1 0); N. M .
STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(A) (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN . tit. IO, § 7505-3 .2(A) (West 2009);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-740(A) (20 1 0); TENN. CODE ANN § 36-l-l l 6(b)( 16)(B) (2010);
.

UTAH CODE ANN.§ 788-6- 140(2) (LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 5A, § 3-702( 1 )
(2002) (describing the process for reporting expenses, most

of which

are paid before the

birth of the child).
53

See, e.g., Agency Policies, ADOPTION ASSOCIATES,

INC.,

http://www.adoptassoc.com/

about/agency_policies/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2010); see also Kurt Mundorff, Children as
Chattel: Invoking the Thirteenth A mendment to Reform Child Welfare, 1 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL'Y & ETHICS 13 1 , 135-36 (2003).
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54
certain fees to third party service providers such as doctors or hospitals.
Such an arrangement insulates agencies from reimbursing expenses that
55
never passed through their hands.
Likewise, third party service providers
who have provided the service for which they are paid owe no duty to
56
reimburse adoptive parents once an adoption fails.
Prospective adoptive
parents are therefore highly unlikely to recover any monies paid in
connection with an adoption from either their own agency or any person
who provided a service related to the adoption.
If anyone owes a duty of reimbursement to prospective adoptive
parents, it should be the birth mother who received housing, medical, and
other benefits and chose not to complete her adoption plan. Still, state law
generally refuses to restore the parties to their original positions by
requiring birth mothers to reimburse prospective adoptive parents for
57
For most
expenses they paid in the wake of a failed adoption.
58
jurisdictions, it is simply a matter of public policy.
Absent evidence of
59
some fraud perpetrated by the birth mother, reimbursement orders are
54 See, e.g.,

GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-13(c) (2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9(2) (West

2001 & Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN § 259.55 (West 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
.

§ 170-B:l 3(I) (LexisNexis 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 14-15-10(1) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3107.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-3.2(B)
(West 2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 2533(d) (West 2010) (providing statutorily
.

approved payments to third party service providers that must be reported to the court); see
also Zierdt, supra note 24, at 34.
55

18 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 52:38 (4th ed. 2001).
56 Id.
57 See, e.g.,

A.L. v. P.A., 517 A.2d 494, 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (holding

that adoptive parents cannot recover any out-of-pocket expenses spent on the adoptive child
while in the adoptive parents' custody if the birth parents breach the adoption contract and
regain control of the child).
58 See id.; see also

Commentary, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that even in successful

agency adoptions, states scrutinize payments, but exercise "very little oversight in
determining what is 'reasonable"'); Gabriel Escobar, Lawyer's Kidnap Case Spotlights
Louisiana Adoption Laws, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1998, at Cl ("[J]ust how carefully
expenses are scrutinized [by state district judges] is an open question.").
59

Where it is clear that a birth mother has perpetrated a fraud on prospective adoptive

parents, state law protects the aggrieved parties rather well. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 273(c) (West 2008) (making it a misdemeanor for any parent to obtain financial benefit
with the intent either not to complete the adoption or to consent to the adoption); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN 525/4.1 (West 2010) (allowing reimbursement when a natural parent
.

either knew she was not pregnant or accepted payments from more than one adoptive
(continued)
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considered too much of a burden to impose on a likely poor woman in
desperate circumstances.60 As a result, prospective adoptive parents are
almost certain not to recover any monies they pay birth parents in
connection with a planned adoption that fails.
However, not all states have chosen such insulation for birth mothers
who receive money from prospective adoptive parents and fail to follow
through with an adoption plan. Idaho law statutorily requires that a court
order a birth parent withdrawing from an adoption to
reimburse the adoptive or prospective adoptive parents for
all adoption expenses including, but not limited to, all
medical fees and costs and all legal fees and costs, and all
other reasonable costs and expenses including, but not
limited to, expenses for food and clothing incurred by the
adoptive or prospective adoptive parents in connection
with the care and maintenance of the child while the child
was living with the adoptive or prospective adoptive
parents.61
Other states should consider Idaho's solution. It appropriately balances the
risk of a failed adoption between prospective adoptive parents and birth
parents. More importantly, the result of the Idaho rule-repayment to

family); IND. CODE ANN . § 35-46- 1 -9.5 (West 2004) (stating a birth mother commits
adoption deception if she knowingly or intentionally benefits from expenses when she
knows or should know she is not pregnant, when the first adoptive parent is not a ware that
another adoptive parent is also paying expenses in an effort to adopt the same child, or
when the mother does not intend to make an adoptive placement); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 1 27.287(2) (LexisNexis 2010) (making it unlawful for any person to receive payment for
medical and other necessary expenses related to the birth of a child from a prospective
adoptive parent with the intent of not consenting to or completing the adoption of the child);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-03(d) (2009) (noting a prospective adoptive parent may seek
to recover a payment if the parent or other person receives or accepts payment with the
fraudulent intent to prevent the proposed adoption from being completed).
Of course, the difficulty of proving fraud in connection with a planned placement of the
child means that these state remedies are not typically useful to prospective adoptive
parents.

See generally John

R.

Maley, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a

Superior Remedy to Annulmentfor Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND.
L. REv. 709 (1987) (proving and recovering even in cases of fraud is unlikely).
60

61

See, e.g., In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1 238-49 (N.J. 1 988).
IDAHO CODE ANN . § 1 6- 1 5 1 5(2) (2009) (allowing prospective parents to failed

adoptions to sue for expense reimbursement and damages).
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prospective adoptive parents in a failed adoption-provides laudable
incentives to adopt. Under such a rule, prospective adoptive parents may
have the financial resources to try again after a failed adoption, and
families considering agency adoption are more likely to try to adopt with
such a risk-mitigating statute.

B. Encouraging a Private Insurance System
Without many state laws to protect their investment, prospective
adoptive parents often emerge from a failed match financially devastated
62
and without the resources to pursue adoption again.
However, that poor
outcome was not always as likely as it is today.
"adoption

cancellation insurance"

was

In the late 1 990s,

available-an

alternative that

greatly diminished the financial risk to prospective adoptive parents of a
failed adoption without necessitating heavy state involvement in the murky
63
Adoption cancellation
policies raised by state reimbursement schemes.
64
insurance is no longer underwritten by any American carrier, but states
should take steps to encourage the return of this form of coverage as a
simple and reasonable alternative to capping adoption expenses or enacting
reimbursement schemes.
Adoption cancellation insurance became available in the United States
in 1 990 but became more commonplace in 1 997 when Kemper Insurance
Agency (a subsidiary of MBO Insurance Brokers) began underwriting
5
policies. 6 The goal of the underwriters offering the policies was simple
to provide, for a fee, coverage to prospective adoptive parents for what
they paid in connection with a planned adoption in the event a birth parent
changed her mind and prospective adoptive parents made adoption-related
66
placement.
Kemper's policies

expenditures without a successful

typically covered expenses paid to a social worker or adoption agency to
have an adoptive home study conducted, any fees paid to the birth mother,
legal expenses, and even travel expenses incurred in connection with the
67
planned adoption.
Yet, the company advertised that the policy could also
62

s
ee supra Part III.A.

63 See CHRISTINE ADAMEC

(2d ed. 2000).

& WILLIAM L. PIERCE, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOPTION 19

64 See

Scherreik, supra note 46, at 1 34E2.
& PIERCE, supra note 63, at 19; see also Adoption Cancellation
Insurance, ADOPTING.ORO, http://www .adopting.org.lmbo.html.bak (last visited Nov. 6,
65 See ADAMEC

2010).
�

67

ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 63,

at 1 9.

See Adoption Cancellation Insurance, supra note 65.
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cover other adoption-related expenses so long as "credible statistics [could]
be collected to predict the size and frequency of future losses. "68 Kemper
issued policies to cover expenditures ranging from $ 5,000 to $30,000 with
69
premiums ranging from $750 to $1 ,900.
The coverage Kemper provided was popular. The company purported
to receive in excess of 1 00 inquiries per month about its adoption
7
cancellation plans and sold roughly 500 policies in 1 997 alone. 0 By 2000,
however,

Kemper-the

only

insurer

still

underwriting

adoption

cancellation insurance-discontinued the line, announcing that providing
the coverage had proved "unprofitable."71
States can, and should, do more to encourage the provision of adoption
cancellation insurance by qualified insurers.

State encouragement and

support of insurance coverage through private carriers already takes place
under circumstances in which insurance carriers struggle with profit
making, and thus, lean toward withdrawing from a particular line of
business. 72 Coverage for hurricane-related losses is one such well-known

7
area. 3 Louisiana, for instance, has created the Insure Louisiana Incentive
Program, which is designed to address the "crisis in availability and

affordability of insurance" in the wake of devastating hurricane loss
claims. 74 This legislative program creates public-private partnerships and
grants matching capital funds in an effort to guarantee adequate insurance
75
coverage in a difficult market.
Moreover, even in the murky family and
parenting arena, many state legislatures have stepped in to require
insurance companies to provide certain coverage they otherwise are

68
69
10
71

Id.
Id.
ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 63, at 19.
Scherreik, supra note 46, at l 34E2.

Such a result is not surprising given the high

failure rate of domestic agency adoptions. See id.
72 see,

e.g. , LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:2362 (2004); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,

FEDERAL REINSURANC E FOR DISASTERS 35

(2002), available at http://www.cbo. gov/
ftpdocs/3 7xx/doc3 787/09-20-FederalReinsurance.pdf (explaining that some states, like
Florida and California, offer state-sponsored natural disaster insurance programs at low
prices).

73 see,

74 Id.
75

Id.

e.g. , LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:2362.
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reticent to provide. Fourteen states, for instance, statutorily require that
health insurance policies include infertility coverage.76
In short, on occasion states do incentivize insurers to provide coverage
that benefits their citizens. With the welfare of such an important group at
stake-children in need of permanent, stable, and loving homes through
adoption-states should act to incentivize private insurers to provide
adoption cancellation insurance as well.
IV. INCREASING TAX INCENTIVES TO ADOPT

Even adoption agencies themselves recognize that the cost of an
agency adoption can overwhelm families and may even prove too great for
some families to bear. 77 One popular adoption resource encourages
prospective adoptive parents to take "cash advances from credit cards,
second mortgages, home equity loans and special adoption loans," to
"borrow from a life insurance policy, 40l (k) or pension plan," and even to
"tap friends and relatives" to manage the cost of adopting a child. 78 There
is no doubt that many prospective adoptive parents will be forced to resort
to drastic measures to make adoption affordable no matter how much it
costs.79 However, the state and federal governments should provide more
assistance in an effort to reduce the number of prospective adoptive parents
for whom adoption is simply not financially feasible.
The federal
government does aid prospective adoptive parents through an adoption tax
credit. so Additionally, a few states provide a similar, smaller credit. st

76 ARK. CODE. ANN . § §

23-85-13 7(a), 23-86-1 I S(a) (2004); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY

CODE § 1374.55(a) (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-509, 38a-536 (West 2007);
HAW . REV. STAT. § § 431:10A-l 16.5, 432.1-604 (West 2008); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356m

(West 2008); Mo. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-8 1 0 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 175, § 47H (West 1 998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 76A, § 8K, ch. 176B, § 41, ch.
176G, § 4, 211 (2007); MASS. CODE REGS. 37. l l ( 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-221521(3)(xii) (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ l 7 :48-6x(a), 1 7:48A-7w(a), 17:48E-35.22(a),
1 7B:27-46 . l x(a) (West 2008); N.Y. lNs. LAW § § 3 2 16( 1 3)(A), 32 21(6)(A) (McKinney
2006); N.Y. lNs. LAW § 4303(s)( l ) (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ l 751.0 l ( A)(7) (West 2009 & Supp. 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § § 27-18-30(a), 27-19-23(a),

27-20-20(a), 27-41-3 3(a) (2008); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 1366.001, 1366.03 (West 2009);
W. VA . CODE § 33-25A-2(1) (LexisNexis 2006).
77 See
1s d.

Gilman & Freivalds, supra note 34.

I

79 See id.
so

l.R.C. § 2 3(a) ( 2006).
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Nevertheless, the credit, even though regularly updated, is outdated and
often does not function as it should in the situation in which adoptive
parents are most needy-in failed adoptions.82
For the 2009 tax year, the Internal Revenue Code provided adoptive
parents a tax credit o f $ 1 2, 1 50.83 The adoption tax credit allows parents of
a child adopted in the tax year to claim a credit for adoption-related
expenditures, including payments made for agency fees, attorney fees,

travel, court costs, and the like. 84
provides

some

The fact that the federal government

recognition of the financial burden borne by adoptive

parents and attempts to incentivize adoption in light of that recognition is
commendable. Still, the adoption tax credit is not generous enough.
The amount of the credit--<;urrently at an all-time high85-still pales in
comparison with the cost of an agency adoption, which frequently costs
parents in excess of $40,000. 86 In addition, the credit carries income
phase-out limitations. 87 In short, the adoption tax credit provides too small
a benefit to too few families.
Moreover, the credit focuses on providing a method of recouping
expenses to families whose adoption attempts have been successful.

The

Internal Revenue Service only recently modified their instructions on the
adoption tax

credit

to clarify that the

"unsuccessful" adoption. 88

credit

is

available

for

an

Even now, the instructions assume that an

unsuccessful adoption attempt is followed by a successful one and require
parents to combine expenses for purposes of the $ 1 2, 1 50 limitation.89 For

81

See, e.g., Ks. STAT. ANN. § 79-32,202 (Supp. 2009); MISS. CODE ANN . § 27-7-22.32

(2010).
82

83

See I.R.C. § 23(b) (2006).
See I.R.C. § 23(h). For adoptions taking place after January l , 20 1 0, the credit will

increase to $ 1 3 , 1 70. William Perez, Adoption Tax Credit, ABOUT.COM, http ://taxes.about
.com/od/deductionscredits/qt/adoptioncredit.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
84

Perez, supra note 83.

The adoptive parent may claim the credit in the year the

expenses are paid if the adoption becomes final that year
adoption is finalized by then. I.R.C. § 23(a)(2).
85

86

87

or

i n the following year if the

See Perez, supra note 83.
See supra note 1 7 and accompanying text.
I.R.C § 23 (b)(2).

The credit begins to phase out for married taxpayers with a

modified adjusted gross income in excess of $ 1 82,520 and is completely phased out at a
modified adjusted gross income of $222,520. Perez, supra note 83.
88

Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Form 8839, at 2 (2009), available at

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8839.pdf.
89

Id. at 2-3.
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instance, if adoptive parents spend $30,000 in agency fees and birth mother
expenses in 2008 for a failed adoption and then another $20,000 in 2009 on
a successful adoptive placement, they are limited to claiming

a maximum of $ 1 2, 1 50.90

one

credit of

This required collation does precisely the

opposite of what the adoption tax credit is designed to do.9 1 The collation

serves to remove tax incentives for trying again after a failed adoption92precisely when prospective adoptive parents need the most incentive to

push forward.93

Finally, the adoption tax credit, warts and all, is set to become even

less useful to adoptive parents after December 3 1 , 2 0 1 1 .94

The credit

sunsets that year, and unless Congress intervenes, the credit will provide
assistance only for a woefully inadequate $5,000 in adoption expenses.95

Congress should act to make the adoption tax credit permanent and to
make it more closely represent the realities facing domestic adoption. The
credit should be more closely aligned with the actual expenses of an
agency adoption today.

Additionally, it should take into account the

frequency with which adoptions fail and the need t o provide more
equitable tax incentives to pursue adoption when those failures arise.

V. A CALL TO REFORM
The stakes of insuring a smoothly functioning agency adoption system
are quite high.

Birth mothers considering adoption deserve protection,

particularly geared at safeguarding the voluntariness of their placement

90

See id. at 3.

91

See Joe Kroll, The Adoption Tax Credit: An Ethical Dilemma, NACAC.ORG,

http ://www.nacac.org/adoptalk/adoptiontaxcredit.html (last visited Nov. 6, 20 1 0) (citing S.
Rep. No. 1 04-279 ( 1 996) (noting the purpose of the credit was to encourage adoption).
92

See Liz Pulliam Weston, The Basics: $10, 000 Adoption Credit Has Many Strings,

MSN MONEY, http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/CollegeandFamily/Raisekids/P3 7251
.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2010) ("[I]f more than one adoption attempt doesn't succeed, or if
you succeed after failing one or more times, your credit for all attempts is limited . . . . ).
"

93

See Angela Krueger, The Effects of Adoption Disruption on the Family: How

Adoptees and Adoptive Families Cope with a Failed Adoption, SUITE 1 0 1 .COM (Oct. 14,
2009),

http://www . suite 1 O l .corn/content/the-effects-of-adoption-disruption-on-the-family

a l 5 886 1 .
94

95

See Perez, supra note 83.

Id.
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Prospective adoptive parents deserve protection so they are

not taken advantage of or financially devastated after failed, or even
successful, adoption attempts. Above all, the children that are the subject
of adoption deserve protection and the full focus of state legislators to
create the best possible opportunities for successful and permanent
97
adoptive placements.
State law can do a better job of striking a balance among all these
parties by increasing regulation of adoption-related expenditures in agency
9
adoptions. Capping adoption expenses, 8 providing reimbursement and
99
insurance remedies in failed adoptions, and increasing tax incentives for
100
adoption
are small steps towards achieving the balance. Each of these
reforms would benefit prospective adoptive parents and would

also

increase public confidence in a system that must remain distinct from a
free market, thereby, benefiting all players involved in agency adoption.

96

See generally Safeguarding the Rights and Well-Being of Birthpar
ents in the
Adoption Process, 2007 EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST.
27-42, available at
http

::

98

99

www.adoptioninstitute.org/publications/2006_ l

l _Birthparent_Study_All.pdf.
See Sanford N. Katz, Rewriting the Adoption Story, 5 FAM.
ADvoc . 9, 1 0 ( 1 98 2) .
See supra Part IL
See supra Part III. A-B.

100

See supra Part IV.

